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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
REX K. CHUGG, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
WILLARD A. LARSEN; Insurance 
Commission of the State of Utah; 
HALS. BENNETT, DONALD 
HACKING AND RUE L. CLEGG, 
Commissioners of the Department 
of Business Regulation of the State 
of Utah and WALTER M. JONES, 
Commissioner of the Insurance 
Commission of the State of Utah, 
Defendants 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Brief Of 
Respondent 
Appeal No. 
8621 
The respondent hereby accepts the appel-
lants statement of facts so far as stated, but the 
respondent de sires to amend, correct and sup-
plement said appellants statement of fact as 
follows: 
The respondent recognizes that appellant, 
Rex K. Chugg, at the time of the automobile ac-
cident in question, was insured under an automo-
bile insurance policy executed by the respondent and 
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2 
properly deliver to appellant Chugg. The facts 
of this case further show that appellent Chuggwa 
under the influence of alcohol while driving one c 
the automobiles in, and at the time of, the a c c] 
dent involved herein, and that-driving while J.n 
that condition was contrary to, and in violation 
of the policy provision quoted .on Page 2 of the 
appallent brief. 
That the said policy form issued to the ap-
pallent Chugg was never filed for approval with 
the State Insurance Commissioner as required 
by law and was not in the form required by, nor 
did it comply with, the provisions and require-
ments of the Utah Safety Responsibility Law. 
It is also a fact in evidence that appellent Chugg, 
prior to the date of the accident he rein involved, 
had never been called upon, by the Division of 
Safety and Financial Responsibility of the State 
Department of Public Safety, to show proof of 
financial responsibility as provided for and r~­
quired under the provisions of the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act, when certain circumstances 
exist and are present. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
For purposes of answering the points raised 
by the appellent and to keep the arguments with-
in those points, the respondent answers the appe 
lents points under the following heads: 
POINT NUMBER I 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERR 
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BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY AS TO THE ALCO-
HOL CONTENT OF A BLOOD SPECIMEN TAKEN 
FROM THE APPELLENT. 
Point Number 2. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO 
ERROR IN ADMITTIN"G TESTI110NY OF AN EN-
TRY OF THE APPELLENTS PLEA OF GUILTY 
TO A CHARGE OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICA-
TED WHICH CHARGE WAS FILED AND EN-
TERED AGAINST THEAPPELLENT IN THE LOGAN 
CITY COURT .. 
Point Number 3 . 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO 
ERROR IN HOLffiNG THERE WAS GOOD AND 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE APPEL-
LENT WAS INTOXICATEDWHILEDRNINGTHE 
AUTOMOBILE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT. 
Point Number 4. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO 
ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THE RESPOND-
ENT'S AUTOMOBILE POLICY OR ITS PROVI-
SIONS, ESPECIALLY AS TO THE INTOXICA-
TION CLAUSE INEFFECTNE, INOPERATIVE 
OR OF NO EFFECT BECAUSE OF: 
(a) THE POLICY HAVING NEVER 
BEEN APPROVED OR FILED FOR AP-
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PROVAL WITH THE UTAH'S STATE INSUR~ 
ANCE COMMISSIONERS OFFICE. 
(b) THE FORM OF THE POLICY BEING 
AT THE TIME OF THE AUTOMOBILE AC-
CIDENT CONTRARY TO THE FORM OF 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES RE-
QUIRED BY THE UTAH SAFETY RESPON-
SIBILITY ACT. 
ARGUMENT 
Point Number 1 
Respondent submits that the law supports 
the introduction of the evidence under the cir-
cumstances herein involved. All parties con-
cede that the accident occurred on August 27, 
1955 at about 9:15p.m" That defendant Chugg 
was taken immediately to the Logan L. D. S. 
Hospital that same evening. That a sample of 
Chugg' s blood was taken that very evening at 
the H::>spital (Tr. 26, 35) by Dr, Robert S. Budge, 
who first observed and treated the defendant 
Chugg at the scene of the accident and then had 
him removed to the hospital. Dr. Budge took 
the blood sample (Tr. 27 & 36). It was sent to 
the laboratory at the hospital where it was found 
that defendant's blood had an alcohol content by 
weight of zero point one seventy five (0 0 175) (Tr. 
2 7) . Dr, Budge extracted the blood sample for 
several reasons. One was because of his suspi-
cion of drunkenes s and because State Highway 
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patrolman Pitcher had ordered it Also the 
doctor was concerned for purely medical rea-
sons to determine if the patient's unconscious 
condition was due to alcohol or a blow on the 
hea~ so as to be prepared to properly regulate 
further and later treatment. (Tr, 36) Respon-
dent concedes that no specific consent was 
obtained for the blood sample but the evidence 
shows that at no time was objection ever raised 
even when the findings were used as evidence 
against defendant Chugg in the City Court on a 
charge of drunkeness. We submit this as an 
implied consent and a waiver. (Tr, 45), 
Respondent submits that no better chain of 
proof could be forthcoming to establish the i-
dentity of the blood specimen and to connect it 
to the defendant at the time of the accident. 
It should be noted by this court that even 
though tlie lower court refused to permit the 
evidence of the blood tests and the evidence of 
the plea of guilty to intoxication at the first 
hearing (Tr. 26, 2 7, 30), then later because of 
connecting evidence and a review of authori-
ties, all this evidence was admitted and the 
courts prior rulings withdrawn (Tr, 47 & 48). 
Your honorable court has just recently 
ruled on the rna tte r of taking a blood sample 
without consent. It is 1n the case of Fretz vs 
Anderson 300Pac .. (2d)642-6 The facts are not 
parallel, but if we interpret the courts decision 
correctly, there is no objection to the introduc-
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tion of evidence of blood samples, even though no 
specific consent was given. 
In the case of State v. Cram (Ore. 1945) 160 
Pac. (2d) 283, we have a case parallel to our own 
case. The defendant was. ~ken to the hospital, 
and while still unconscious, a blood sample was 
taken at the request of the police officer and for 
the doctor's use to determine further necessary . 
treatment. Defendant was later charged with man-
slaughter and this evide·nce used against him but 
no objection was raised, no motion made for sup~ 
pression of evidence or objection to the method of 
blood extraction. We also have that condition in 
the case before the court. We submit it is equiv .. 
alent to consent. This case very thoroughly re- -
views the decisions, upholds the lowet court mal-
lowing the evidence, and held that no rights of the. 
defendant had been violated. 
In the case of People v. Haeussler (Cal. 1953) 
260 Pac. (2d) 8, 12 we have another case of taking 
blood while the defendant was still unconscious, 
for the dual purpose of an alcohol test and to de= 
termine future treatment as the doctor in the case 
before the court testified he also did (T. 36). The 
California court also held no rights violated and 
allowed the evidence to be admitted. 
The following cases also support this rule:-
State v. Ayres(Ida. 1949)211 Pac. (2d) 142~ 
Block v. People(Co1o. 1951)240 Pac. (2d)512. 
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The fact that the present case is a civil 
case and not criminal makes no difference: 
See Kuroske v, Aetna Life Insurance Company 
(Wis.1940) 291N.W. 384, 25A_L.R. (2d) 1415, 
See Wigmore on evidence Vol. VIII» Sec. 2265 
and especially the recent supplement material. 
Point Number 2, 
Respondent submits that authorities are 
overwhelming in number, allowing evidence of 
a guilty plea in evidence under the circumstances 
of this case. Open pleas of guilty in a court are 
admissible in subsequent civil actions involving 
the same offence. (20) Am. Juris,~ Evidence, 
Sec. 648 p. 545). Courts are quite universal 
in their application of the rule that convictions 
after a trial on the evidence, are not admissible 
but pleas of guilty are admissible, and the tend-
ency of courts is to be more liberal in this re-
gard even with convictions after trial ( 18 A. L. R, 
(2d) 1289, 1290, 1307). 
It would be multiplying words to say more 
but Respondent would like to add that one of the 
main reasons for this rule is that when such pleas 
are made under the restrictions and hazards of 
criminal prosecution, certainly the defendant 
should have no cause to complain under the les-
ser strain of civil actions, Then a defendant 
always has the privilege of explaining why he 
entered his plea. May we suggest the f o 1-
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lowing case s as controlling : 
Roper v. Scott (Ga, 1948) 48 S. E. (2) 
118c 
Morrissey v. Powell (Mass, 1939)23N. 
E. (2d) 411. 
McClainv. Allstate Life Ins. Co,. 
(Ohio 1948) 80 N. E. (2d) 815. · 
Kochv. Elkins (Ida.l950) 225 Pac,(Zd)457. 
Olsen v. Meachem(Cal. 1933)19 Pac. {2d)527. 
People v. Oldsmobile Coupe (Cal. 
1947) 181 Pac. (2d) 950-53. 
Miller v. Blanton (Ark. 1948) 210 S. W. 
(2d) 293. 
The appellant has cited certain Utah sections 
supplemented by a Minnesota .case. (Pages 7&8 
of appellant' s· Brief). Whatever logic or v.eight 
it might have, at best it is only a minority rul-
ing. The respondent has in other ways shown 
the defendant's drunkeness so that the record 
of his plea is only supplementary but the re-
spondent certainly is entitled to some way of -
showing intoxication when the defense is avail-
able in its policy and it is a legal defense. 
Further a plea of guilty is a confession and a 
statement against interest and should be given 
full weight as such" Respondent submits that 
where the very issue goes to the matter pleaded, 
evidence of that plea or confession could be ad-
mitted in line with the authorities cited by re-
spondent. 
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Point Number 3. 
looking at the overall picture of the ques-
tion of intoxication, where it is as here, the ba-
sic issue of the lawsuit, certainly the courts 
should allow the fact of intoxication to be proved 
by some means that is possible and reasonable 
within the realm of usual human relations. For 
the sheer convenience of the court, the respon-
dent has tried, in this case, to supply that evi-
dence from every available source. A blood test 
was taken, and it tested .out at a figure which our 
law says is beyond a safe driving margin, Our 
law allows up to 0. 15% of weight (Utah Code An-
notated 1953 Sec. 41-6-44 (b)3) and there is no 
question or dispute that the appellant's blood 
tested 0. 175% by weight. Respondent does not 
feel there is any question about the records sup-
porting the fact that it was Chugg' s blood that was 
tested on the night of the accident. We submit 
that the law supports the respondent in all phases 
of the results of that test being admissible as ev--
idence. Respondent again submits that the defen-
dent Chugg gave an implied consent to the blood 
test and waived his rights, if any he had, to ob-
ject to the test in that neither he nor his counsel 
ever objected to the test, or asked for its return 
or suppression as evidence. Timely objectives 
must be raised to take advantage of cases of lack 
of consent. 
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The respondent produced the record of 
Chugg' s own confession (Tr, 28-29) and this C~Y .. 1gg 
verified on the witness stand (Tr. 45) and took his 
opportunity to explain why he so plead. 
Lastly the respondent put an officer on the 
stand who by the appellant's own brief admits 
was under the opinion defendant Chugg was intox-
icated on the night of the accident. (Tr.l9 to 23, 
incl.). The law permits such opinions and the 
deputy sheriff gave several reasons to support his 
opinion. 
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THERE IS NOT ONE 
WORD OF EVIDENCE TO REBUT THE RESPON-
DENT'S TESTIMONY EXCEPT DEFENDANT CHUGG' 
ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN HIS PLEA OF GUILTY TO 
INTOXICATION, 
Point Number 4. 
Our state law does require that a form of 
all insurance policies must first be filed with the 
State Insurance Commission before that policy 
can be issued, delivered or used, (U. C. A. 
1 9 53 Sec. 3 1 - 1 9-9 ( 1) . A copy of the policy in-
volved in this case, and sold and delivered by 
the respondent to the defendant Chugg$ was never 
filed with the Insurance Commissioner before the 
accident But respondent submits that an unap= 
proved policy. even though issued, delivered and 
used, remains enforceable in accordance with its 
terms, except for provisions prohibited by Statute 
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The Utah insurance code sets up no standards or 
restrictions on the form of an automobile insur-
ance policy or on required or prohibited Provi-
sions. (See U.C.A. 1953 Sec. 31-19-35). The 
appellant has referred; on page 10 of its Brief, 
to a restriction set out in Utah's Safety Respon-
sibility Act which under certain circumstances. 
becomes a restriction on automobile policy pro-
vision in this state, but may I refer to that below. 
The respondent briefly contends the follow-
ing for the problems raised in Point Number 4: 
The Safety Responsibility Act of Utah is 
what is termed as a voluntary law. No one 
is forced to buy insurance, nor is anyone in 
any other way compelled to show evidence of 
financial responsibility, when they procure 
a drivers license. Proof of financial respon-
sibility is not required until after the first 
serious accident. Therefore the policy pro-
visions required by the Safety Responsibil-
ity Act(U. C.A.l953 Sec~41~12-21 (f) can~ 
not be required in a policy until after the 
first serious accident. The Financial ResJ:Xn-
sibility Division of the Department of Public 
Safety have no control over this problem un-
til the first accident. The State Insurance 
Commissioner is only required by law to en-
force the insurance Code of the State (U. C. A. 
1953 Sec. 31 ~2 ... 1). As to Utah law which sets 
up the requirements of what is, and when to 
make, proof of financial responsibilitys see 
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Sees. 41-12-1 (K), 3, Sa, Sb, Sc, 18, 19, 21, 
2lf( 1), of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
This is the system used by states under the 
voluntary system. 
The respondent urges that in the cases 
that where a policy has been issued with pro-
visions contrary to the Safety Responsibility 
Act BEFORE PROOF OF FINANCIAL RESPON-
SIBILITY HAS BEEN DEMANDED the policy sets 
up the contract between the insured and the in-
surer and they are bound by all its terms not 
contrary to law. As explained above there was 
no law prohibiting the respondent from insert-
ing the Intoxication Exclusion Clause BEFORE 
Proof of Financial Responsibility was required 
of defendant Chugg, These policy provisions 
are also binding on third party claimants under 
the contract such as defenda.nt Willard A. Larsen 
whose rights are no greater than the insured. 
Please note that it was stipulated between the-
parties that if wiL:_esses were called, the tes-
timony would be that defendant Chugg did not 
have his license suspended nor had he ever 
been called upon to show proof of financial re-
sponsibility prior to, or even after~ the accident. 
(Line 28 of Page 5 to Line 30 of Page 6 of Sup-
plemental Transcript Testimony taken November 
21st, 1956). In support of these views the re-
spondent submits the following: 
Section 4297 in Vol. 7 of Insurance Law 
by Appleman reads as follows: 
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"Where the person insured was not 
one required to qualify under a Finari: 
cial Responsibility Statute (underlining 
mine), even though a general form of 
endorsement is contained in the policy, 
it has been held that the rights of the 
third persons are no greater than those 
of the insured. Consequently the insur-
er has been permitted to set up a defe·nse 
of lack of notice, failure to cooperate, 
(under exclusions, etc.) restrictions as 
to emergency use, like by an officer." 
In the case of McCann v. Continental Cas-
ualty Co. (Ill. 1955) 128 N. E. {2d) 624, the in-
sured had a policy covering only his family, 
This policy was in conflict with the provisions 
of the Financial Responsibility law which re-
quired a regular omnibus clause. This is a 
third party plaintiff attempting to force cov-
erage under the terms of an omnibus provi "" 
sion. The court found that because of no prior 
accidents and never having been called upon to 
show proof of Financial Responsibility, the 
Financial Responsibility Act of Illinois was 
not applicable "unless the insured by his pre-
vious conduct had brought himself within its 
purview". (627)lllinois was under a voluntary 
and not a compulsory law as Utah. 
This same rule is followed in the follow-
ing case: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v, 
Georgiana (N, J, 1951) 82 Atl. (2d) 217, 
This of course is submitted by the respon-
dent in support of its claim that the ~efenda n t 
Willard A. Larsen, would have no rights against 
the respondent under the policy, or any of its pro-
. vis ions, written on defendant Chugg by the re span-
dent. 
The cases just referred to show how the 
courts hold where a voluntary law as Utah's is in 
force, and its effect on the rights of the insured 
and third parties b.efore proof of financial respon-
sibility. It makes no difference that the policy 
had not been filed and approved with the Insurance 
Commissioner. 
See: 
Rogers v. Penn.Mutual Life (Pa.l94) 
26 AtL (2d) 127, 129-30. 
Herman v. Mutual Life Ins .. Co. (Fa, 
1939) 108 Fed. (2d) 678, 682. 
Hopkins v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. 
( N. Y . 1918) 121 N. E, 46 5. 
Reddington v. Aetna Life Ins., Co. (N" Y. 
1942) 34 N.Y .. Supp. (2d) 957-60. 
The appellants have referred this honorable 
court to the compilation of cases in 1 A, L. R. (2d) 
822 & 29 A. L .. R. (2d) 811 as proof that the safety 
responsibility restrictions were effective against 
the policy herein involved before and at the time of 
the accident. A rn.ere reading of the material in 
those citations shows they apply to 
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compulsory or mandatory laws and have no ap-
plication to our Utah situation. All those cases 
are decided under laws where the safety r e-
sponsibility provisions are applicable from-
the beginning rather than where Proof of Fin-
anc4tl Responsibility must first be shown as 
in Utah. 
See also - 34 A. L. R. (Zd) 1293-98 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin (N-.H. 
1951) 84 Atl. (2d) 823. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The respondent urges that the lower court 
erred in neither of its decisions and that said 
respondent is entitled to request this court to 
uphold said lower court in the following:-
(a) That there was sufficient evidence 
to prove defendant Chugg was driving 
an automobile while under the influence 
of alcohol contrary to law, and the terms 
of his insurance policy with the respond-
ent that all of the evidence pertaining there-
to was properly admitted and the lower 
court committed no error. 
(b) That the Utah Safety Responsibility 
Law is not a compulsory law so that be-
fore proof of financial responsibility is 
required of an insured he is not subject 
to the Financial Responsibility Laws; 
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and that therefore the prov1s1ons of any auto-
mobile insurance policy would be binding on 
the insured and any third party involved in an 
accident with the insured and that said third 
party would get no further rights than the in-
sured; and that further, the Insurance Com-
missioner of this state does not have to en-
force the Safety Responsibility laws and that 
the mere fact that the automobile insurance 
policy form herein involved was not filed and 
approved by the respondent does not effect the 
issues herein. 
(c) And that more specifically, that defendant 
Chugg was intoxicated, which made his auto-
mobile policy unenforceable; that because our 
Utah Safety Responsibility Law is Voluntary 
and not Compulsory in operation, that law was 
not operative against defendant Chugg at the 
time of the accident; that therefore the third 
party Willard A. Larsen has no further rights 
in, to, or as a result of the terms and condi-
tions of said policy than those enforceable by 
defendant Chugg; that the policy issued and de-
livered to defendant Chugg by the respondent 
violated no provision of the Utah Insurance 
Code and that all other findings and orders of 
the lower court in its findings, conclusions 
and decree be upheld by this honorable court. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
C. N. OTTOSEN 
65 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent~ 
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